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SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
C.R.-C. v. R.C.
(decided September 1, 1999)
In April of 1998, R.C. filed a petition with the Family Court in
Rockland County, New York, seeking permission to relocate with
his child, K.C., to Bucks County, Pennsylvania.2 R.C. had joint
-custody of K.C. with C.R.-C., and the court decided that the
application should be denied.' Shortly thereafter, R.C. moved with
K.C. to a New Jersey location, which was far closer than the
requested move to Bucks County, Pennsylvania. K.C. remained in
the same New York school, continued seeing the same health care
providers, and continued the same custody and visitation schedule
with both parents.4
In August of 1999, C.R.-C. filed a petition to modify the
custodial visitation schedule in her 1995 New York divorce
judgment. The respondent, R.C., filed an affirmation in opposition
and an attorney's affirmation raising the jurisdictional issue in
which he asserts that, since the child's home state is New Jersey,
the New York court is without jurisdiction. This case presents the
question of whether New York State Family court jurisdiction
under Domestic Relations Law § 75-d(l)(b)6 is pre-empted by 28
USCA § 1738A,7 the Federal Kidnapping Prevention Act.
I C.R.-C. v. R.C., 695 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1999 N.Y. Fam.Ct.), application to
dismiss denied.




6 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 75-d(1) (McKinney 1998). The statute states in
pertinent part:
A court of this state which is competent to decide child
custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination by initial or modification decree only
when: ... (b) it is in the best interest of the child that a court
of this state assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his
642
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When Congress legitimately exercises its legislative power,
conflicting state legislation may be invalidated via the Preemption
Doctrine.! The Supremacy Clause9  mandates that federal
legislation override any state legislation that conflicts with the
federal legislation, to the extent that both cannot stand."0 In recent
years, Congress has enacted legislation, which sometimes conflicts
with legislation traditionally in the domain of the states." When a
federal law does not expressly take the field, such legislation
comes under judicial review to determine whether the state
parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a
significant connection with this state, and (ii) there is within
the jurisdiction of the court substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships ....
Id
7 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (1994). The statute states in pertinent part:
A child custody determination made by a court of a State is
consistent with the provisions of this section only
if... (2)(B)(i) it appears that no other state would have
jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best
interest of the child that a court of such State assume
jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the child
and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with
such State, and (I) there is available in such State substantial
evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training and personal relationships[.]
Id
8 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, TREATISE ON CONSTnTONAL
LAW § 12.1 at 62 (2d ed. 1992).
9 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Preeemption Doctrine
derives from this article which states in pertinent part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id
10 Id at 62, 63.
" Id at 63.
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legislation is actually in conflict with the federal legislation and,
therefore, subject to preemption. 12
Before deciding the instant case, the court assumed the
jurisdictional authority for the case. The court made the
assumption that:
[t]his child and at least her mother have a
significant connection with the State of New York
-and that there -is within the jurisdiction of the court
substantial evidence concerning the child's present
or future care, protection, training and personal
relationships. Therefore, for the purpose of
deciding this application the court is assuming that
it is in the best interests of the child for a court of
this state to assume jurisdiction. 3
The court then considered whether it had jurisdiction under
Domestic Relations Law § 75-d(l)(b) to decide the issue of
visitation. The court acknowledged that the Appellate Divisions
are not in agreement on the issue and "a definitive answer will
have to be given by the Court of Appeals."' 4
The court examined the decisions made by the First, Second,
Third and Fourth Departments. The most recent of these decisions
is Hahn v. Rychling,"5 decided by the Third Department in early
1999.16 Hahn decided that New York State's Domestic Relations
Law 7 must be read, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, as
12 Id.
13 C.R.C.-C., 695 N.Y.S.2d at 912 (adding that the respondent retains the right
to contest this assertion ofjurisdiction, if he so chooses). Id.
14 Id.
15 686 N.Y.S.2d 136, (3d Dep't 1999).
16 Id. (holding that New York courts lacked jurisdiction to modify a New York
court's order where Michigan had become the four year old child's "home state"
due to the fact that he had resided in Michigan for ten months immediately
preceeding the proceeding). Id. at 139.
17 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 75-d(1) (McKinney 1998). The statute states in
pertinent part:
A court of this state which is competent to decide child
custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination by initial or modification decree only
644 [V/ol 16
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PREEMPTION
incorporating the additional limitation set forth in the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),'" which precludes jurisdiction
unless "it appear[s] that no other state would have jurisdiction
under [28 U.S.C. §1738A (c)(2)(A)], i.e. that no other state is the
"home state" of the child... . 9 The C.R.-C. court reasoned that
the Third Department had adopted a clear test to establish
jurisdiction, which hinges on whether another "home state" would
preclude an assertion ofjurisdiction by a New York court.
However, in the instant case, the court looked to Hahn for the
logic of the dissenting argument, which is validated by the
decisions of the other three Appellate Departments. The court
points out that the dissenting opinion in Hahn v. Rychling explored
a "crucial point" that the majority failed to recognize.2  This
crucial point centers on the pertinence of subdivision (d) of 28
U.S.C. §1738A, which states that "[t]he jurisdiction of a court of a
State which has made a child custody determination consistently
with the provisions of this section continues as long as the
requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met
when: ... (b) it is in the best interest of the child that a court
of this state assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his
parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a
significant connection with this state, and (ii) there is within
the jurisdiction of the court substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships[.]
Id
's 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (1994). The statute states in pertinent part:
A child custody determination made by a court of a State is
consistent with the provisions of this section only
if... (2)(B)(i) it appears that no other state would have
jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best
interest of the child that a court of such State assume
jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the child
and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with
such State, and (I) there is available in such State substantial
evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training and personal relationships[.]
Id
19 Id
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and such State remains the residence of the child or of any
contestant." The Hahn dissent points out that the cases relied
upon by the majority (Warshawsky v. Warshawskyz3 Matter of
Perri v. Mariarrossi,24 Matter of Michael P. v. Diana G. 5) sought
not to nodify- prior custody determinations, but to obtain them in
the first instance.26 Therefore, §1738A (d) is applicable.2 7
The dissent further argues that § 1738A (d) exempts proceedings
which seek modification of a prior custody determination of that
same jurisdiction from the "no other state" requirement of § 1738A
(c)(2)(B).28 The Hahn dissent reads §1738A (d) with emphasis on
its specific reference to subsection (c)(1) of that statute, while the
majority reads it as referring to §1738A (c) in its entirety.29
22 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (d).
23 226 A.D.2d 708, (2d Dep't 1996) (holding that the PKPA precludes New
York State from asserting jurisdiction only where no state satisfies the "home
state" analysis, but that the lower court erred in declining jurisdiction pursuant
to DOM. REL. LAW § 75-d(1)(b) because no other "home state" existed on the
facts presented).
24 172 A.D.2d 671, Iv. denied, 79 N.Y.S.2d 757, 583 N.Y.S.2d 193, 592
N.E.2d 801 (2d Dep't 1991) (dismissing an action in a visitation dispute because
Florida met the "home state" criteria after the mother fled to that state with her
children in order to protect them from their father's "bizarre" behavior).
25 156 A.D.2d 59, Iv. denied, 75 N.Y.2d 1003, 557 N.Y.S.2d 308, 556 N.E.2d
1115 (1st Dep't 1990) (dismissing an action initiated by the child's father while
the child was visiting from her "home state" of Wisconsin as defined by N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 75-c as "the state in which the child at the commencement of
the custody proceeding, has resided with his parents, a parent, or a person acting
as a parent for at least six consecutive months").
26 Hahn, 686 N.Y.S.2d 136 at 140.
27 id,
28 Id
29 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (c) reads, in pertinent part:
A child custody determination made by a court of a state is
consistent with the provisions of this section only if--() such
court has jurisdiction under the law of such state; and (2) one
of the following conditions is met; (A) such State (i) is the
home State of the child on the date of the commencement of
the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state within
six months before the date of the commencement of the
proceeding and the child is absent from such State because of
his removal or retention by a contestant or for other reasons,
and a contestant continues to live in such State; (B) (i) it
646 [Vol 16
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The interpretation of the importance of the word "and" at the end
of subsection (c)(1) determines whether the conditions in (c)(2)(B)
should be included or excluded in the exception provided by
§1738(d).3 The Rychling dissent reasons that if the word "and" is
important, as the majority had "erroneously" determined, then
(c)(2)(B) allows jurisdiction if it appears that no other State would
have jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, "and" is unimportant to
subsection (d), then (c)(1) rightly prevails and "such court has
jurisdiction under the law of such State."3'
The C.R.-C. v. RC. court embraces the dissenting argument of
Rychling and finds it consistent with case law from the First,
Second and Fourth Departments.32 That case law which is
seemingly consistent with the majority decision of Rychling is
distinguishable by the difference between those petitioners seeking
a modification order and those bringing a de novo custody petition.
In the Fourth Division, a modification proceeding was allowed
to continue in the case of Clark v. Boreanaz,3 even though New
York was not the child's home state.' The court held that the
PKPA did not preempt New York from exercising jurisdiction in
modifying its prior custody determination because one of the
contestants still resided in New York and because jurisdiction
might be proper under New York state law.35 The court reinstated
the petition and remitted the case to the state supreme court to
determine whether Domestic Relations Law §75-d (1)(b) would
allow New York to assert jurisdiction.36
appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under
subparagraph (A).
Id
30 C.R-C., 695 N.Y.S2d at 913.
31 Id.
32 C.R.-C., 695 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
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The court found three First Department decisions which appear
to support the Rychling majority (Croskey v Taylor,3 7 Rosenberg v.
Rosenberg,3"and Michael P. v. Diana G.39), but none of those
petitions involved a modification of a prior New York order.40
Therefore, as ,the Rychling dissent allowed, §.1738A, subsection
(d) did not apply to permit New York to assert jurisdiction because
a home State other than New York precluded jurisdiction under thep~A 41
PKPA.4
Finally, the court reviewed a number of'Second Department
decisions that distinguished between a de novo custody petition
and a petition for modification of a prior New York custody
order.42 The court noted the significance of the decisions of the
Second Department, which reinforce the Rychling dissent under a
variety of circumstances.
The court allowed the assertion of New York jurisdiction in
Heitler v. Hoosin, '3 holding that the PKPA was not violated by an
assertion of jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law § 75-d
(1)(b), even though there was another home State of the child. The
court affirmed the Family Court's assertion of jurisdiction to
modify the parties' New York divorce judgement.'
37 183 A.D.2d 680 (Ist Dep't 1992) (upholding the dismissal of an action
because the child did not fit any of the criteria which would indicate that New
York is the child's "home state").
31 160 A.D.2d 327 (1st Dep't 1990) (upholding a New York State cause of
action after California declined to assert jurisdiction because the father and his
children had been in New York for six months and intended to remain there).
39 156 A.D.2d 59 (1st Dep't 1990) (holding that the father's withholding of his
daughter from her custodial parent is exactly the type of behavior the PKPA was
intended to prevent so the PKPA preempts DOM.REL. LAW § 75 and precludes
New York State jurisdiction).
40 C.R-C., 695 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
41 Id.
42 Id
43 Heitler v. Hoosin, 143 A.D.2d 1018, 1019, 533 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't
1988) (concluding that although New York has jurisdiction over the proceeding,
it is in the best interest of the child for New York to decline jurisdiction because
Illinois is the more appropriate forum, as substantial evidence concerning the
child's present and future care is more readily available there).
44 Id at 1019, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
648 [Vol 16
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In Irwin v. Schmidt,45 the appellate court of the Second
Department held that the Family Court properly exercised
jurisdiction to modify its prior custody order, even though Florida
was the "home State" of the children.' The evidence indicated
that the children had a strong connection to New York both before
they relocated to Florida and after their mother was granted
temporary custody by a Florida court.'
Where there was no indication that the petitioner was seeking a
modification of a prior New York custody order, the Second
Department determined that New York could not assert jurisdiction
in the application for visitation in Perri v. Mariarossi.4 The
appellate court also precluded an assertion of jurisdiction by a New
York court when New York was the home state of the child.
Kansas had issued the initial custody order in Capobianco v.
45 236 A.D.2d 401, 653 N.Y.S.2d 627 (2d Dep't 1997).
4l61 at 402, 653 N.Y.S.2d 627 at 628.
47 II
4 172 A.D.2d 671, 568 N.Y.S2d 637 (2d Dep't 1991) (holding that the
mother had relocated to protect the children from the sometimes violent
behavior of their father, who was diagnosed as suffering from a mental illness,
and not for any reasons of avoiding an adverse custody determination which
would invoke jurisdiction under DOM.REL.LAw § 75-b(I) (e), and the existence
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Willis,49 and the Second Department held that the Kansas Statutes
§38-1303(a)(1)(1988), which is identical to New York Domestic
Relations Law §75-d(1)(a), retains jurisdiction over modification
of its initial judgment.5
This colirt. re-states .the analysis ,of .he ,Rychling dissent in
determining that the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act does not
preclude a New York court from asserting jurisdiction to modify
its own prior custody determination. Subsection (d) of 28 U.S.C
§1738A does not require that subsection (c) be read in its entirety,
but means exactly what it says in directing the reader to apply
subsection (c)(1).
Roger Moran
49 Capobianco v. Willis, 171 A.D.2d 834, 567 N.Y.S.2d 770 (2d Dep't 1991)
(holding that even though New York could claim jurisdiction, the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act required New York to defer jurisdiction to the
Kansas courts since Kansas had not declined to exercise jurisdiction).
50 Id. at 836, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
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